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In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries when the declining Byzantine Empire 
was finally superseded by the new sociopolitical system devised by the Ottomans, 
increase of encounters and intensification of communications between Byzantine and 
Muslim intellectuals gave an impetus to the composition of ‘dialogues with Muslims on 
religious issues’ by several Byzantine literati. The present dissertation analysed three 
of these dialogical works based on real discussions with Muslims in which the authors 
(Manuel II Palaiologos, George Amiroutzes, Gennadios Scholarios) participated, with 
special attention to the communicational medium used to discuss religious topics with 
‘infidels’ and the ideals about the relationship between the Byzantine intellectuals and 
Muslims represented by the authors via a variety of images of the Byzantine and 
Muslim interlocutors in the works. As the result of this analysis, it became clear that 
the authors valued ‘philosophical and rational arguments’ to smooth the communication 
with those not having Christian faith, and that the final objectives intended by adopting 
these arguments varied according to the authors, reflecting the change of the 
sociopolitical environment under which they composed the works: while Manuel used 
  
them to reinforce the Byzantine imperial ideology, Amiroutzes and Scholarios employed 
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After the appearance of Islam in the seventh century, Greek-speaking writers 
began, inside and outside the confines of the Byzantine Empire, to make mentions and 
remarks about this new ‘sect’. These were, in the long time span to the period of the 
Ottoman rule, a number of writings classified into various genres such as reports or 
articles in historical narratives or heresiological writings, theological works specifically 
aiming at refuting Islam, letters and dialogues.1 These writings, often deeply connected 
with one another by imitation or ‘collage’, developed formulaic arguments to criticise 
Islam by comparing it with Christianity. They can be divided into three categories: 
criticism on Muhammad, criticism on the Quran and criticism on doctrines of Islam. 
These criticisms are: Muhammad is a false prophet because he lacks predictive 
descriptions about him in the previous Scripture, supernatural signs to confirm his 
divine mission and moral behaviours to show his dignity; the Quran is a false scripture 
because it is full of errors, distortions and inventions; the doctrines of Islam are not 
right because they do not lead mankind to the divine salvation but to violence and 
                                                   
1 For general information about respective anti-Islam polemical works, and their 
relations of influence with each other, see E. Trapp, Manuel II. Palaiologos, Dialoge mit 




This dissertation treats ‘religious dialogues with Muslims’ written by Byzantine 
writers in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries when the long history of interaction 
between Byzantine Greeks and Muslims finally shifted into a new phase in which the 
former were, without ‘their own’ nation, placed in an inferior status to the latter. The 
dialogical works in Byzantium have their history which should not be overlooked. 
Inheriting literary heritage and formal models from the previous ages, they continued 
to be composed in different forms and for different purposes, such as philosophical 
dialogues to pursue certain topics, satirical dialogues to illustrate aspects of the 
societies in which the authors lived, didactic dialogues to teach students a set of 
knowledge in certain fields and polemical or apologetic dialogues to maintain the 
authors’ stances in controversial issues.3 Here, to encompass the totality of this genre 
in Byzantium with such a great variety, I define the ‘dialogues’ as the writings in which 
two or more interlocutors converse, exchange information, express their opinions, or 
discuss and debate.  
The dialogical works falling under this definition are not necessarily what 
                                                   
2 See Th. Khoury. Polémique byzantine contre l’Islam (Leiden, 1972) pp. 11-17. 
3 For the categorisation of the dialogical works and examples in each category, see A. 
Ieraci Bio ‘Il dialogo nella letteratura tardoantica e bizantina’ in Garzya (ed.) Spirito e 
forme nella letteratura bizantina (Naples, 2006) pp. 21-45. 
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someone deems to be the ‘ideal dialogues’ in which they think that this literary form can 
maximise its merits: the dialectical development of a thesis or polyphony by 
interlocutors, none of whom is destined to be overwhelmed by the arguments of others, 
for instance. Indeed, many of the Byzantine dialogues are ‘monologic’ in that one of the 
interlocutors as the avatar of the author in these works is designed as having such 
intellectual superiority as to defeat the others (polemical dialogues) or rule them by his 
intellectual hegemony (didactic dialogues). Still, such a prescriptive definition of the 
dialogue is useful only as an ideal type which hardly can be found in actual writings 
produced in any age4 and is less practical for the analysis of the dialogical works in 
Byzantium because it often results in their general devaluation in comparison with the 
works written in the ancient or modern world. Rather, it would be more profitable to see 
traces of ‘the voices of Others’ betraying the authors’ experiences of real 
communications with them in the ‘monologic’ structures of the writings, especially in 
cases where the dialogical works derive from specific and actual debates. Also, it is 
important to investigate the interplay in the texts between the fictional ideals by which 
the self-consciousness of the authors was sustained and the realities represented as 
otherness for the purpose of shedding light on fluctuations of identities of the Byzantine 
                                                   
4 Cameron is also sceptical about the application of the definition of the dialogue 
invested with ahistorical ideas such as ‘open-ended’ or ‘democratic’. See A. Cameron, 
Dialoguing in Late Antiquity (Washington D.C., 2014) pp. 7-13. 
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authors and images of the Others. 
This is the reason why I focused on the polemical dialogues about Islam and 
Christianity based on the authors’ real discussions with Muslims in the late and 
post-Byzantine period: in addition to the fact that the dialogical form permits us to find 
self-images of the Byzantine intellectuals and those of Muslims quite distinctly, the 
referentiality of the dialogues to the actual discussions and the political and social 
situations surrounding them makes it easier for us to be more sensitive to the 
distinction between the reality and the fictionality included in these dialogical works 
and to observe conflicts and negotiations between those two agents lurking in the 
structures of the dialogues and representations of the interlocutors. Through analysis of 
the images of the Byzantine intellectuals and the Muslims in the texts and the 
representations of relations between them as the mixture of the realities in the critical 
age and the authors’ ideals, we can approach their changing identities and relationship. 
The dialogical works treated in this dissertation are those written by Manuel II 
Palaiologos, George Amiroutzes and Gennadios Scholarios. All of them were prominent 
intellectuals and writers at that time and each dialogue is based on an actual discussion 
with Muslims on religious topics in which the author participated in person in an 
interesting situation from the viewpoint of the relations between Byzantine Greek 
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literati and Ottomans. These instances of direct intellectual communications with 
Muslims are novel in the history of the anti-Islam polemics produced within the 
territory of the Byzantine Empire. In addition, there is another original trait common to 
the dialogues in question: they present an emphasis on arguments based on knowledge 
of Greek secular philosophy. In view of the fact that another dialogical work supporting 
these philosophical or rational arguments was composed by Theodore Abu Qurra, an 
Orthodox theologian living in northern Mesopotamia in the eighth and ninth centuries5 
(although he wrote in Syriac and Arabic and some of his works were translated into 
Greek), there seems to be a correlation between the direct communications with 
Muslims and the emphasis on the philosophical arguments. In this respect, it seems a 
good strategy to regard them as a focus of the negotiations between the authors’ ideals 
and the realities of the actual discussions which they experienced and to pay particular 
attention to how these arguments are used in the dialogues, particularly seeing that the 
other anti-Islam or apologetic arguments are often covered by a thick layer of the 
established formulaic arguments inherited from previous writings as a result of the 
refinement of each topic caused by the progress of ‘technologisation’ of the genre of the 
                                                   
5 A. Argyriou & G. Lagarrigue, “Georges Amitoutzès et son “dialogue sur la foi au 
Chirist tenu avec le sultan des Turcs”’, Byzantinische Forschungen 11 (1987) pp. 56-57. 
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polemic and apologetic dialogue.6 
Consequently, in the following chapters, I will investigate the dialogues of the 
above-mentioned three Byzantine intellectuals in chronological order, with special 
attention to the status of the philosophical or rational arguments and the represented 
images of the interlocutors in each work. This will allow us to see how the authors 
attempted to represent themselves and the Muslims and how what they considered to 
be a desirable relationship between themselves and the Muslims was transformed over 
a period of time when Byzantium was disappearing as a political entity. 
 
  
                                                   






Manuel II Palaiologos: Dialogues with a Persian 
 
This chapter treats the first dialogical work in the late Byzantine period with 
themes of Christianity and Islam based on a real discussion with a Muslim: Dialogues 
with a Persian by Manuel II Palaiologos. By analysing the function of ‘rational 
arguments’ in the writing, we will see how the author tried to present ideal 
representations of the Byzantine emperor and the Muslim and a relationship between 
them which the author thought was desirable. 
 
Manuel Palaiologos was the second son of the emperor John V Palaiologos born in 
the mid-fourteenth century, when the Byzantine Empire had shrunk to a small state 
barely including Eastern Thrace, Thessaloniki, southern Peloponnese and some islands 
in the Aegean Sea. The empire kept declining as he grew up, and even before he had to 
govern as an emperor this last remnant of the Roman Empire had sunk into a politically 
and economically desperate situation. He was involved in strife with his elder brother 
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and nephew, struggled in vain to save Thessaloniki from the Ottoman siege, and was 
forced to perform a humiliating duty as a vassal of the sultan Bayazid I: the subjugation 
of Philadelphia, the last Byzantine city in Asia Minor, to Ottoman rule.7 
On the arrival of the news of the death of John V, he secretly escaped from the 
sultan’s entourage and in Constantinople acceded to the imperial throne in the spring of 
1391. The prestige emanating from this title, however, did not help him to be exempt 
from the vassalage which compelled him to participate in the campaign in Asia Minor 
which began in the summer of the same year. It seems to have been during the sojourn 
of the troops at Ankara during a severe winter8 that he had a disputation with a 
Muslim scholar (Mouteritzes: the Greek transliteration of ‘Müderris’) on religious issues 
of Islam and Christianity. This experience inspired the emperor to compose a dialogical 
work titled ‘Dialogues with a Persian’, the redaction of which was presumably 
completed by 1399 when he sailed to Western Europe for military aid to save 
Constantinople from the Ottomans’ years-long siege. 
                                                   
7 For biographical information about Manuel II Palaiologos before he became an emperor, 
see J. Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus (1391-1425): A Study in Late Byzantine 
Statesmanship (New Brunswick, 1969) pp. 1-83. 
8 It is thought that the stay in Ankara to avoid the cold was from November to 
December in 1391. See Barker, 1969: pp. 97-99; E. Trapp. Manuel II. Palaiologos, 
Dialoge mit einem “Perser” (Vienna, 1966) p.54. In addition, a letter from Manuel to 
Demetrios Kydones proves his stay at Ankara. See E. Legrand, Lettres de l'empereur 
Manuel Paléologue : publiées d'après trois manuscrits (Amsterdam, 1962) pp. 30-31. 
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According to the text, Manuel and the Mouteritzes held an approximately 
twenty-day discussion which was triggered by the deep curiosity of the Mouteritzes 
about Christian doctrines. It began with some doctrines and legends of Islam such as 
paradise, polygamy and Muhammad’s ascension into heaven. It progressed to the 
subject of the legitimacy of Islam and Muhammad in comparison with the other divine 
laws (the Mosaic law and Christianity), followed by Manuel’s lengthy apologetic for 
Christian doctrines (e.g. the Trinity, the Incarnation, the veneration of icons). Finally, 
this dialogical work reaches its climax when, persuaded, the Mouteritzes declares that 
he will convert to the Christian faith and go to Constantinople to pursue the study of it. 
This storyline of Manuel’s work which is divided into 26 ‘dialogues’, as scholars 
who have edited and studied it point out, is not deemed to be the same as the actual 
progression of the discussion with the Mouteritzes. This supposition can be corroborated 
by the author’s ideological and intellectual backgrounds. Firstly, Manuel was above all 
the ‘emperor of the Christian world’, however limited his actual power was with the 
decline of the empire. Therefore, it is not hard to imagine that ideological necessity 
made him represent himself as the triumphant emperor in his work, surpassing a 
Muslim scholar in intellect by concluding the Dialogues with an ideal but implausible 
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end.9 In addition, Manuel was well educated by Demetrios Kydones and deeply imbued 
with classical Greek literature and philosophy. His study in these fields made him not 
only a quite prolific writer but also a loyal follower of the literary and rhetorical 
conventions of Byzantium.10 It is thus quite reasonable to assume that the author 
modelled the Dialogues on the Plato’s works, given that stylistically the work imitates 
Attic Greek and, in many instances, the Socratic dialogues to drive the Mouteritzes into 
aporia. Both features of the Dialogues are too artificial to think that they reflect what 
was spoken in the real discussion. 
Nevertheless, as we shall see, these ideological restrictions and literary 
refinements do not seem to have effaced the reality of the actual discussion from the 
Manuel’s work. This ‘reality’ is of interest to us for exploring what the emperor 
experienced on the occasion. In addition, detecting the reality in the whole text will 
effectively shed light on fictional parts which are subject to author’s intention or bias as 
well as to commonplace assumptions or ‘prejudices’ of the contemporary intellectual 
milieu in Byzantium. 
The degree to which the scholars working on the Manuel’s work recognise reality 
                                                   
9 Reinert argues that the conversion of the Mouteritzes is indicative of the political 
interpretation of conversion in the imperial ideology: the ability to convert infidels and 
assimilate them with Rhomaioi symbolises the power of Byzantine emperors. See S. 
Reinert, ‘Manuel II and His Müderris’ (1991): p. 47. 




and fictionality in it varies among them. For example, Khoury argues that the real 
discussion was not rearranged much and the author made an effort to be loyal as much 
as possible and report exactly the tenor of the interlocutor.11 Förstel emphasises its 
fictional characteristics based on the author resorting to arguments given by previous 
Byzantine polemical works against Islam and his alleged misunderstanding of Islamic 
doctrines as well as the aforementioned storyline leading to the Mouteritzes’ 
conversion,12 and concludes that all the conversations in Dialogues 11 - 17 and 21 - 26 
are fictional.13 Here I will address this issue by reinvestigating the following points 
which are partly similar to those presented by Förstel: 1. the problem regarding 
dialogical structure of the work; 2. the reliance on John VI Kantakouzenos’ apologetic 
and polemical works; 3. the incomplete correspondence between the sections of 
dialogues and the number of days which passed during the discussion; and 4. the 
mentions by the Mouteritzes of ‘unorthodox’ doctrines and legends of Islam. 
Apart from the obvious fictionality of the final conversion of the Mouteritzes, there 
are other seemingly fictional traits in favour of the Emperor in the Dialogues. One of 
them is the imbalance of the volume of speech allotted to the Emperor and the 
                                                   
11 Th. Khoury. Manuel Paléologue / Entretiens avec un Musulman, 7e Controverse 
(Paris, 1966) pp. 18-19. 
12 K. Förstel, Manuel II. Palaiologos / Dialoge mit einem Muslim (Würzburg 1993, 1995) 
vol. 1, pp. XX-XXII, XXVI-XXXI, vol. 2, pp. XV-XVII. 
13 Förstel, 1996: vol. 3, p. XVIII. 
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Mouteritzes. Throughout the work, the Emperor’s arguments and explanations often 
extend to multiple pages in every edition, while the Mouteritzes’ speeches seldom 
exceed one page; many of them are brief replies either simply agreeing with the 
Emperor’s opinions or constituting parts of leading questions (often reductio ad 
absurdum) set by the Emperor, or a proposal to change topics by which the Mouteritzes 
seems to conceal his inability to refute the Emperor’s arguments. Under such 
circumstances, we could not expect much room for the Mouteritzes to object to the 
Emperor effectively and expound his views sufficiently. It is difficult to suppose that in 
fact the Mouteritzes always let Manuel take the initiative in the discussion in this 
manner. 
Secondly, Manuel, as he states in the preface, knew that there had already been 
some anti-Islamic polemical works. In addition, Trapp and Förstel state that a large 
part of Manuel’s arguments were taken from other previous works, especially from the 
writings of his grandfather John VI Kantakouzenos (Four Apologies and Four Logoi 
(treatises) based on Ricoldo da Monte Croce’s ‘Contra legem Sarracenorum’ translated 
by Demetrios Kydones).14 Manuel’s reliance on Ricoldo and Kantakouzenos has been 
meticulously studied by Förstel and he concludes that Manuel rarely introduced new 
                                                   
14 For example, the arguments about the criticism of the Islamic interpretation of 
paradise and lust, and almost all the apologetic topics. See Förstel, 1993: vol. 1, pp. 
XX-XXII; Trapp, 1966: p. 86. 
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topics to his work. Actually, one can find that many detailed topics, for example on 
specific verses of the Quran, treated in Kantakouzenos’ works, are omitted from the 
Dialogues.15 As Förstel maintains, Manuel’s originality perhaps may primarily lie in 
the selection and extension of fundamental topics in a refined style and with the help of 
rhetorical devices.16 From the deep reliance on the previous writings as well, it is 
evident that the Dialogues are structured to provide ideal settings to demonstrate the 
triumph of Christian truth through the Emperor’s intellectual victory against 
Mouteritzes, rather than to record faithfully what was really spoken in the discussion. 
These fictional alterations to meet the author’s ideal also seem to have left traces 
in the work as structural inconsistencies: the sections of the dialogues and the days 
which passed during the discussion fail to correspond. Until Dialogue 20, each Dialogue 
approximately corresponds to the passage of one day, usually from morning to night, 
and this chronological order is easily recognised through description of situations by the 
author or mention of time passage by the protagonists, both placed at the beginnings 
and the ends of the Dialogues. This principle is not observed from Dialogue 21 on and 
the last 4 Dialogues do not give us any sign that they are held on more than one day.17 
                                                   
15 See the lists of topics treated in the four logoi: K. Förstel. Johannes Kantakuzenos / 
Christentum und Islam, Apologetische und polemische Schriften (Altenberge, 2005) pp. 
236-243. 
16 See Förstel, 1993: vol. 1, pp. XXIV-XXV. 
17 Although Trapp argues that the word protrita (= three days ago) in the 24th Dialogue 
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The reason for this change is not clear, but it would have been difficult for such a thing 
to happen if the Dialogues were either completely fictional or non-fictional because in 
the former case the author would have made the correspondence complete and in the 
latter case the inconsistency would not have occurred. Rather, it is suggested that this is 
an incidental consequence of the process of the composition process of the work: perhaps 
the author made use of the original time structure of the discussion along with the 
situational information recorded in his notes, and developed the chosen topics on this 
structure in a prearranged order to culminate in the Mouteritzes’ conversion. Whether, 
toward the end of the work, Manuel may have made the text longer to dramatise the 
discussion or simply noticed that there were not enough ‘days’ left for treating all the 
selected topics, he would have had to make some sections of the Dialogues outside the 
chronology in view of the volume of the texts. 
This fictional handling by Manuel in the composition of the Dialogues, on the 
other hand, probably contains indications of the reality of the discussion which Manuel 
had in Ankara. Even if someone took a stance that the very discussion with a Muslim 
scholar in the winter of 1391 is fictional on the ground that there is no allusion to it in 
any source apart from the Dialogues in question, it would not matter so much for our 
                                                                                                                                                     
indicates the discussion about the Incarnation in the 23rd Dialogue, this discussion 
begins in the 22nd Dialogue. See Manuel, XXIV, 3.2; Trapp, 1966: p. 55. 
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purpose because we can say that the text contains elements which would otherwise be 
derived from Manuel’s experience of some kind of actual communication with one or 
more Muslim intellectuals. However, this sceptical assumption seems unnecessary in 
view of the above-mentioned structural inconsistencies which seem to confirm the 
actuality of the situational information provided in the Dialogues. 
Despite the prevailing fictionality of the Dialogues, Manuel declares in the preface 
that this work was written to provide a practical way to respond well to Muslims,18 
which would have been impossible if the work were totally fictional. In fact, there is 
more persuasive and discernible evidence of the reality included in the Dialogues: some 
‘unorthodox’ doctrines or legends of Islam presented by the Mouteritzes, such stories as 
Muhammad’s intercession to Jesus for condemned sinners, 19  Muhammad as 
Paraclete,20 and the Second Coming of Jesus as the judge.21 
The first two stories do not derive from Kantakouzenos’ writings, and according to 
Trapp, there is no clear evidence for other previous anti-Islamic polemical works which 
                                                   
18 Förstel, 1993: vol. 1. pp. 8-10 (= Preface, section 10 of Manuel’s Dialogues, according 
to division of sections by Förstel. Hereafter, cited or mentioned texts of Manuel’s work 
are referred to in footnotes simply as ‘Manuel’, followed by the numbers of the section 
and optionally subsections). 
19 Manuel, II, 3.4-5. Criticism on Muhammad’s intercession is found in earlier writers. 
See Förstel, 1993: vol. 1, p. XXI. 
20 Manuel, VIII, 1. This constitutes one of the Islamic traditions. See Encyclopaedia of 
Islam (2nd ed., 1960-2005) ‘Aḥmad (vol. 1, p. 267)’. 
21 Manuel, II, 3.2. 
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Manuel would have consulted in composing the Dialogues.22 With respect to the third 
story, although Jesus’ living ascension to heaven and his second arrival on earth for 
forty days followed by his death in the Islamic tradition are found in Kantakouzenos,23 
the story of Jesus as judge seems actually to have been told to Manuel by the 
Mouteritzes. The story was mentioned by Gregory Palamas in his letter to his own 
diocese in Thessaloniki while relating his experience when he was captured by Ottoman 
Turks and staying in their territory.24 Förstel regards it as fictional on the basis of its 
unorthodoxy,25 but it is a discourse advocated by Ibn Arabi,26 and influence of such a 
mystic tradition should not be underestimated, especially in the syncretic environment 
of medieval Anatolia.27 As evident from these examples, even if Manuel’s work is 
largely fictional, it is reasonable to suppose that some arguments presented by the 
Mouteritzes (and in some cases Manuel’s responses to them) reflect the real discussion, 
especially when they show no trace of deriving from previous works or in cases where 
there was no necessity to integrate them into the work in view of the author’s intended 
                                                   
22 Trapp, 1966: p.86. This is based on the fact that no clear instance of ‘reuse’ of topics 
and discourses of previous anti-Islam polemicists is found except for John 
Kantakouzenos’ works. 
23 Förstel, 2005: Logos III, 7. 
24 D. Sahas, 1980 ‘Captivity and Dialogue: Gregory Palamas (1296-1360) and the 
Muslims’ The Greek Orthodox Theological Review 25, pp. 414, 422. 
25 Förstel, 1995: vol. 2, p. XVII. 
26 Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd ed. 1960-2005) ‘⁽Īsā (vol. 4, pp. 81-86, especially p. 85)’. 
27 See E. Zachariadou, ‘Religious dialogue between Byzantines and Turks during the 






In the remarks of the Mouteritzes which seem to have been made in the real 
discussion, what is most interesting when we see the representation of the relationship 
of the Emperor and the Mouteritzes is his desire for discussion on a rational basis and 
his request for explanation using rational arguments. In these requests and the 
Emperor’s responses to them, we can observe traces of the author’s struggle to integrate 
the experience which he obtained from the discussion with the Mouteritzes into the plan 
of the work demonstrating the victory of Christianity. 
The word ‘rational argument’ comes from Förstel’s ‘Vernunftargument’ which is 
the translation of ‘logismos’ in the Manuel’s work, and its concept is also based on  
‘raisonnement’ proposed by Khoury who argued that it is one of the novel traits of 
Manuel’s Dialogues in the history of the Byzantine anti-Islam polemical works.28 
Although he does not present its clear definition, it is considered to be a sort of analogy 
for explaining theological matters and is constructed on knowledge about the things 
which are perceptible through human senses such as (natural) philosophy and general 
exemplifications rather than scriptural tradition and metaphysical reasoning. 
                                                   
28 Khoury, 1966: p. 18. 
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The Mouteritzes, not satisfied with the Emperor’s explanation of Christian 
doctrines, often asks him for rational arguments and the latter answers the former’s 
requests. For example, when the Emperor argues for the limit of human perception and 
the importance of faith to support both the apophatic and cataphatic aspects of the 
Orthodox theology, he uses as an example the difficulty of classification in zoology: 
 
We know much about things that they exist accidentally, sometimes beautiful 
or ugly, and it is possible to think philosophically about their greatness and 
faculties, but from there we can reach neither exact understanding of them, 
nor about the properties of the things living by the senses and appearing to 
eyes. […] In those living by senses there are land-animals, aquatic animals and 
winged animals. […] The land-animals are prevented from being called 
viviparous because all turtles and serpents and some other things are 
oviparous. If someone would like to call the aquatic and winged animals 
oviparous, he states nothing exact, because you would see viviparous animals 
even in the aquatic ones and an animal that suckles in the winged animals (it 
is called a bat, I think) and some fish fly (whose name is flying-fish), […] Thus, 
it is in general less difficult to say if something exists and I think that it is 
24 
 
rather difficult to say what it is and how it is and why it is and it is not always 
possible. God created everything through the Word and knows everything 
about them in advance, but He did not allow us to have this power.29  
 
The attitude of the Emperor and author Manuel toward these rational arguments 
is ambivalent. Manuel is less inclined to rely on them than on argumentation based on 
the Scripture when he can use the descriptions in it, and in almost all cases it is only 
after the Mouteritzes asks for the rational arguments that he develops them.30 For 
example, when both protagonists discuss the veracity and the significance of the 
Passion and the Resurrection, the Mouteritzes demands: 
 
First, do me a favour, that is, combine rational arguments with what is stated in 
the Bible on the Passion of the unaffected and the death of Life (I am already 
about to utter your phrases), and then give me testimonies from the Bible on the 
                                                   
29 Manuel, IX, 4.3-5. Note that all translations of the works written in Greek or Latin 
treated in the dissertation are made by its author. 
30 Based on the analysis of arguments of both interlocutors, Demetracopoulos argues 
that the Mouteritzes likes ‘rational’ argumentation more than the more revelational 
emperor Manuel. See J. Demetracopoulos, 2008 ‘Pope Benedict XVI's Use of the 
Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos' Dialogue with a Muslim Muterizes: The 





Resurrection. You must be eager [to do so], because when what you said about 
the Passion and the death was shown as good, it would be easier for you to 
persuade by delivering the remark on the Resurrection. Since I am unsatisfied 
with Jesus’ death, how would it be easy that I believe in the Resurrection?31 
 
Indeed, Manuel declares in the preface that rational arguments will be used as a 
tool to persuade the Mouteritzes by adapting theological truth to his level of 
comprehension, even if he risks debasing it: 
 
Therefore, he [= the Mouteritzes] had such reason as cannot well appropriately 
reach the hidden divine meaning in the Scripture. Hence we held converse not as 
it should be, but so that he can receive what was said....Consequently, in not a 
few things which required the ally of the Bible, I was forced to fight stripped, so 
to speak, of the weight of the [biblical] words and weapons from there and 
instead usually conversed using reasoning (logismos) and examples, which were 
also appropriate to the capacity of the listeners.32  
 
                                                   
31 Manuel, XIII, 4.1. 
32 Manuel, Preface, 12-13 
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 In the course of the discussion also, the Emperor says that analogical methods of 
explanation using temporal things and knowledge are not sufficient to reveal 
transcendent properties of God. 
 
But remember that I was always demonstrating that this mystery is not subject 
to knowledge, words or reasoning: the [human] reason should not be superior to 
the divine nature, just as it should not with regard to how the divine word was 
incarnated.33 (XVI, 1.2)  
 
However, the Mouteritzes’ intellectual insufficiency is not the only reason why the 
Emperor often ends up accepting the Mouteritzes’ demands: the persuasiveness of the 
Scripture as evidence is largely curtailed by controversy over whether it is genuine or 
forged. Consequently, the Emperor makes a concession about the way of argumentation: 
 
If you, not believing in corrupted words [=Islam], did not say that the holy Bible 
was destroyed by us, it would be easier for me to have the power to disperse the 
cloud of your unbelief....Now that I am deprived of the ally which no one can 
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resist, hereafter I will try to show you by rational arguments what surpasses 
reason, words and sounds...(X, 4-2) 
 
      Nevertheless, the Emperor, even after having recognised these difficulties, 
continues to rely on scriptural citations. In the following 11th Dialogue whose main 
topic is Christology, we can find approximately 60 citations and mentions of Scripture. 
This fact indicates that the Emperor prefers discussion founded on Scripture and the 
discussion on the basis of rational arguments is a practical expedient due to the 
communication with the Muslim intellectual. The preference of the Emperor in the text 
is evidently common to that of the author himself. Since the rational arguments were no 
more than the second best way to explain Christian doctrines, the author would not 
have resorted to the rational arguments and included them in his work unless the 
Mouteritzes had asked for them in the real discussion. Of course it can be thought that 
his original requests may have been different from those appearing in the Dialogues 
and perhaps they went through some refinement in the process of composition in order 
to enable the interlocutors to hold a more ‘philosophical’ discussion suitable to the 
author’s literary ideal. Still, Manuel’s ambivalent evaluation and reluctant attitude to 
the rational arguments also suggests the existence of real communication which was 
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crystallised in the fictive dialogues.   
 
    Faced with the unexpected intellectual challenge by a Muslim scholar, Manuel was 
forced to compromise on the manner of argumentation in discussing religious matters 
by using rational arguments. To control this element which is potentially subversive of 
what he considered as ideal disclosure of Christian truth, he confirms in the Dialogues 
two kinds of victories of Christianity: the victory of divine revelation over human 
reasoning based on perceptible things, and the victory of the Christian Emperor in the 
realm of natural philosophy. The way in which the relationship of both protagonists is 
represented in Manuel’s work also plays an important role that contributes to these 
victories.     
 
     The author’s intention to submit human reasoning to faith based on religious 
revelation is obvious. In Dialogues 8 and 9, the Emperor argues for the superiority of 
religious belief revealed by God over scepticism or agnosticism which results from a 
thorough application of the apophatic view about the God without supposing the 
presence of the divine grace illuminating the human reason. In response to the 
Mouteritzes’ remark that commitment to the faith of an existent religion does not 
29 
 
impart to human beings the capacity to grasp the divine truth by reasoning, the 
Emperor maintains that once they have the right faith as the prerequisite for sound 
reasoning, they are able to distinguish the divine truth from falsehood and this is the 
only way to attain the former: 
 
Mouteritzes ‘Who knows all things, even if he follows completely the right and 
truest thinking and mistakes nothing, believing in God, as everyone simply does, 
but in God whom he has never seen and known exactly? How would we know 
clearly the one beyond any comprehension, how would the limited reason 
comprehend the unlimited? So it is good not to rush into having reasoning, but to 
be calm and wait for that inextinguishable and unceasing light, which will make 
clear to everyone’s eyes what is now doubtful, so better and clearer than it seems 
to us now that the immortal world must be superior to the mortal one’34  
 
Emperor ‘It is impossible that the things which have nothing harmonious with 
each other coincide. What would doubt and faith have in common, just as light 
and darkness or truth and falsehood? One should not betray himself and say 
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that he is pious, unless he is steadfast, firm, unbent, unshaken and concisely 
speaking remaining the same about the faith in God in any time and situation, 
and should not think that the others suffer from the same thing as he suffers on 
the basis of the fact that he lives in darkness. Rather, he should go out to the 
light and then he will know well how the darkness is not obscure in the light. If 
one does not benefit from the light, he will not know what lies at his feet at all 
and at the same time, quite reasonably, imagine that everyone feels the same as 
him. For the one who was born and brought up in the darkness has never 
experienced the light will not believe in those who tells him about anything 
about the light’35  
 
     Both protagonists agree in that they do not acknowledge the unlimited faculty of 
the human intellect and reasoning without divine help. What makes the Mouteritzes 
different from the Emperor in this regard is the denial of the link between a right faith 
being possible to exist in the age and the world in which he lived and the ability of faith 
to supplement human reason with the divine illumination in order to reach the full 
cognition of God. This denial caused the Mouteritzes to have a relativistic view about 
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religions and prevent him from having what he considers to be an excessive reasoning 
in search for the truth which is essentially agnostic for humanity due to its nature 
transcending the concepts formed on the basis of perceptible things. It is quite natural 
and logical, on the other hand, that his stance is recognised by the Emperor as 
something that should be surmounted by the emphasis on the superiority of faith 
because, from the Emperor’s perspective, it is the very opinion of the Mouteritzes that 
can be interpreted as a result of an uncontrolled practice of human reasoning without 
the guidance of the divine revelation: it can be said that his principle of prudence 
formed as relativism and scepticism is not completely applied for the process of thinking 
which forms such ideas. 
Now that the efficacy of human reasoning that solely relies on temporal and 
perceptible things is limited in comparison with revelation of the faith, the above 
argument of the Emperor can also be seen as a proof that he puts no greater value on 
rational arguments than as a way to facilitate the Mouteritzes’ understanding, and 
explains why he needed to add a great number of apologetic arguments relying on 
scriptural citation. In the fifth Dialogue he employs the theory of Tychē to express an 
apparently agnostic view that one cannot deduce the legitimacy of a religion from 
prosperity of its believers and vice versa because prosperity solely depends on the will of 
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God regardless of the virtues of a nation.36 This remark, however, can be understood 
better when we think that it derives from his understanding of the apophatic aspect of 
divine nature rather than agnosticism as a result of reasoning based on secular 
philosophy. The victory of divine belief over human logic is one of the most fundamental 
leitmotifs throughout his work, and for that reason the author attempted to structure 
the work so that the reality which he experienced can be subject to his ideal. 
 
Although the rational arguments for explaining Christian doctrines are given 
subordinate status to those based on the Scriptures, this does not mean the Emperor 
does not respect philosophical knowledge. He employs some philosophical discourses 
mainly in introductory parts of the work that come before the apologetic topics.37 For 
example, faced with the Mouteritzes’ contention that ‘many of our people renowned for 
their wisdom think that all animals are rational’,38 the Emperor clarifies the distinction 
between human beings bestowed with reason and thus free will and animals or plants 
having only ‘nature (physis)’ which organises body functions and passions: 
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While the properties of nature are thus evident, those of reason are also clear, 
which you can find in mankind among all the animals. A fruit of reason is to act 
voluntarily even if nature does not often assist it at all, but counteracts it by all 
means. It is only mankind who accomplishes it.39  
  
So such is our situation, but that of the animals differs from this. […] All the 
four-legged animals, birds and sea animals […] act, suffer, avoid and pursue the 
same things eternally, and their behaviour is utterly without reason. Their 
movement of birth, growth or decline is subject to neither free will nor reason. 
How can they do so lacking these, when even we living by reason and free will 
cannot? Neither what gives birth gives birth voluntarily nor what is born is born 
voluntarily, and it is possible to give birth to a mixed animal in an unnatural way, 
but what gives birth cannot give birth to something other than what it is 
according to the nature.40 
 
The Emperor’s argument based on this philosophical knowledge seems to have been 
recognised as convincing by the Mouteritzes, because he responds: ‘I would like to hear 
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such evident demonstrations about all the other things, for you have persuaded me 
about these things’41  On the other hand, the Mouteritzes also has recourse to a 
philosophical discourse when he argues that Islam is the best religion due to its golden 
mean in comparison with incomplete Judaism and Christianity, whose precepts are too 
severe to be observed. He says: 
 
The Law of Muhammad proceeds on the middle way, brings practical, truly 
gentle and philanthropic precepts and wins against all the other Laws in all 
respects by being moderate. […] You know well that virtues always avoid 
excesses and hold the middle exactly, and this is what is and is called a virtue. 
[…] This has been taught by all the ancients.42 
 
Therefore, the Mouteritzes in the text is represented as having philosophical 
knowledge at least to a certain degree, and the philosophical discourses by the Emperor 
are presented as being comprehensible to the Mouteritzes. Although neither the author 
nor the Emperor makes a remark about the value or significance of Greek philosophy 
and the Emperor’s rational arguments are also used as a mere practical tool for the 
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explanation to the Mouteritzes, the Dialogues have some room for the arena of 
philosophical discussion, in which the Emperor demonstrates his superiority to the 
Mouteritzes in this field, in addition to his excellence symbolised by the triumph of the 
religious revelation over the human reasoning. 
 
      For the purpose of supporting the above two kinds of victories, Manuel utilises a 
variety of images of the Emperor and the Mouteritzes, all of which contribute to 
constructing the representation of the relationship between both interlocutors as that of 
an ideal teacher and student. By investigating how both the protagonists behave in the 
Dialogues and then analysing their images extracted from their modes of behaviour, we 
can trace the author’s strategy in the relational representation between them so as to 
confirm the intellectual superiority of the Emperor. 
As stated above, the Mouteritzes is represented as a ‘good student’, who is usually 
obedient to his teacher. In the discussion, the Mouteritzes’ fierce responses to the 
Emperor are quite rare. An exception is his reaction which is triggered by the Emperor’s 





Mouteritzes ‘On what ground do you think that the life of that man 
[=Muhammad] is not good?’ 
Emperor ‘On what ground is it not far from any goodness? Is it not full of greed, 
blood and extreme depravity? Did it not experience every licentiousness? Did it 
reach the acme of injustice?’ 
The elder [=Mouteritzes] got angry at this, like all the people with him (many of 
his acquaintances, townspeople or foreigners, were present, who were spending 
the whole day comfortably, filled with the zeal for listening to me)... and they 
asked me to use milder words for this man: they cried that it is not suitable to 
commit an outrage to such an old man.43  
 
 Yet, he accepts in general the criticism against Islam by the Emperor. Faced with 
condemnation of the polygamy of Islam, for instance, the Mouteritzes, after blushing 
without saying a word for a while but seemingly delighted with his knowing what he 
wanted to know, states that the doctrine of Islam about women seems vain and 
unsound. 44  Furthermore, he is sometimes quite patient in trying to accept the 
Emperor’s stances even if he is not totally persuaded by his arguments, as we can see in 
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the way in which the Mouteritzes responds to the Emperor’s counterargument to 
agnosticism: 
 
Mouteritzes ‘To tell the truth, I glorify my religion as being better than any 
religion, but cannot have an utterly certain opinion [about it]. Still, I think that 
you are in the same situation as me, for I can conjecture well, I think, another’s 
situation from my own. Such is my logic and I would not be able to be easily 
persuaded by your arguments, even after it seemed to me that they were very 
strong, while, if you are steadfast, rigid, unbent and unshaken about your religion, 
probably you understand your arguments, because I think that what you have 
argued was really good and would not have wanted to try to refute it.’45  
 
This reaction of the Mouteritzes is ambivalent in that it can be seen as an evasion 
to interrupt the discussion on the present topic and also as his attempt to be persistent 
in his relativistic stance by being tolerant of the Emperor’s argument. Still, it is 
regarded as being well indicative of his gentle and polite attitude toward his teacher. 
To be a good student one is required, of course, not only to be obedient to one’s 
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teacher, but also to be eager to study what is taught. The Mouteritzes satisfies well this 
condition, for he is well-motivated to know the ‘truth’ from the Emperor as evident from 
the beginning part of the first Dialogue, where the Mutertzes tells the Emperor the 
reason why he asked for the discussion on religious issues: 
 
I have had an enduring desire to meet a man who teaches me your religion. But I 
have never encountered Christians who are wise and adept in it to such a degree 
that they can tell me something clear and as I would want... If what you will say 
seems to be true, probably my words will seem to be otherwise, and who is so 
irrational as to prefer untruth to truth? This [= the fact that I pursue truth] is 
clearly demonstrated from this: it is not permitted for us to have a dialogue with 
the Christians who are said to have much persuasiveness. If I were not an ardent 
lover of truth, I would not neglect the order hindering us from doing it [= dialogue] 
and otherwise never join in such a game [= discussion].46  
 
 Another example demonstrating the Mouteritzes’ love for truth is that he is 
sometimes so eager to continue discussion that he does not care about the passage of 
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time and exhaustion of the audience: When the discussion on the veneration of the icons 
terminated, the Emperor managed to send home the Mouteritzes who, despite a crow of 
a rooster, denied that the dawn was coming soon and insistently asked the Emperor to 
give him a discourse on the Incarnation.47   
In addition to these sincere attitudes of the Mouteritzes toward the discussion 
which represent him as a good student, he has another trait by which to render himself 
more ideal or controllable for the Emperor: the intellectual competency of the 
Mouteritzes is lowered so as not to be a threat to the structure of the Dialogues which 
leads him to the conversion in the end. He is not able to refute the Emperor’s arguments, 
and is inclined to, especially at the ends of the respective dialogues, interrupt discussion 
without a counterargument to escape his impasse. When the Emperor argues that the 
Word of God and the Holy Spirit are not creatures, the Mouteritzes proposes that ‘since 
we have got tired and your body also has been exhausted by hunting [sc. in which he 
had joined as one of the retinue of the sultan], we should drive the discussion just as a 
ship to a harbour of silence and next morning to the sea of the dialogue again, and then 
accomplish the journey with good fortune’, which are referred to by the Emperor as ‘his 
[=Mouteritzes’] accustomed evasion’. 48  A clearer criticism by the Emperor of the 
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Mouteritzes’ digression can be seen in a part of the eighth Dialogue, when the latter, 
after listening to the former’s explanation on what the Paraclete is, told his sons that ‘it 
seems to me good that we should allow the many circumlocutions [sc. by the Emperor] 
and not intend to dispute about them. Let this man show us that the Word of God is 
truly God as he insisted, and this would suffice’49, to which the Emperor replies: 
 
This is not about allowing circumlocutions, but about asking for them and finding 
out refuges. Your most swift leap to another topic after what you had brought to 
the discussion has been judged as not progressing as it seemed to you, but is 
simply an act of those who escape and go forward into the labyrinth.50  
 
 Such digressions and evasions are surely what the Emperor complains about, but 
the Mouteritzes’ inability to present effective counterarguments results in ceding the 
initiative of discussion to the Emperor to make it easier for the author of the Dialogues 
to arrange the topics which he wished to develop.  
The Mouteritzes’ intellectual inferiority in the text is further emphasised by the 
fact that he plays the role of confirming the Emperor’s arguments by simply agreeing 
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with them and falling prey to his leading questions. Below is one of the most salient 
examples in which the Emperor refutes by reductio ad absurdum the Mouteritzes’ 
argument that Muhammad was the Paraclete, because such an argument necessarily 
implies that the Paraclete is just one of the creatures and not consubstantial with God: 
 
[Emperor] ‘Tell me, is God not spiritual?’ 
[Mouteritzes] ‘Yes.’ 
[Emperor] ‘Is He not the truth itself?’ 
[Mouteritzes] ‘Who thinks that He is not?’ 
[Emperor] ‘Then what is the Paraclete? Not the spirit of the truth? You would not 
deny it: for it is what you have just said, rather, it is the words which 
you have brought for yourself.’ 
[Mouteritzes] ‘It is as you say.’ 
[Emperor] ‘Then does this Paraclete proceed from the Father or is anyone willing 
to deny it?’ 
The sons of the Mouteritzes said to him: ‘we could never deny what is clear, for 
the Word who sent the Paraclete said 
quite clearly that it was a spirit and 
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proceeded from the Father.’ 
 I, favorably receiving their understanding and memory about what is needed [for 
the discussion], said:  
‘Look, my friends, how the Paraclete is God: for what springs 
from something naturally just as from a fountain or a root is 
akin to and of the same nature as what brought forth it.’ 
 [Mouteritzes] ‘What you said seems probable, but although I could say something 
about it, I put it aside for the present. For I dare not join in this 
dispute.’51 
 
Quite naturally, this evasion induces an ironic remark by the Emperor that 
actually the Mouteritzes’ incapacity to counter-argue forces him to escape from the 
discussion in which he might have been compelled to explain his stance more. Indeed, 
the employment of this Socratic dialogue is not so effective as it looks in logical terms 
because it simply presents the common properties of God and the Paraclete and refers 
to their relation that the latter proceeded from the former: The common properties, that 
both are spiritual and true, do not necessarily support their identity with one another 
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and this identity depends on the mode of the relationship between them. Therefore, the 
validity of the Emperor’s argument is less based on the logical construction of the 
Socratic dialogue than the definition of the verb ‘proceed (ekporeuein)’ being decisive in 
the consubstantiality between the father God and the Paraclete, on which here both the 
interlocutors fortunately seem to agree. Still, the impression of the Socratic dialogue is 
quite vivid from a rhetorical point of view, and the author succeeds in having the 
Mouteritzes’ answer to the Emperor’s sarcasm by a sort of sour grapes in which he, 
though not persuaded, admits the Emperor’s intellectual victory.52 
As a result of the analysis of many aspects of the Mouteritzes’ behaviour, it is now 
clear that the author represents him as an ideal student for his politeness, obedience 
and ardour, but this ideal image, especially with respect to his intellectual faculty, is 
carefully controlled so as not to be a potential threat to the intellectual superiority of the 
Emperor. In accordance with this representation of the Mouteritzes, the Emperor is also 
represented as a gentle and tolerant teacher. He is very persistent throughout the 
Dialogues in explaining the Christian doctrines at length and answering the 
Mouteritzes’ questions and demands for rational arguments despite the latter’s 
inclination to change the topics in a seemingly abrupt and capricious way. He does not 
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make an ad hominem attack on the Mouteritzes when criticising the doctrines of Islam, 
and occasionally he praises the Mouteritzes’ knowledge and brightness: when the 
Mouteritzes argues that Christianity is too strict for human beings to observe by 
enumerating a variety of its doctrines, the Emperor, although ironic about the audacity 
of the Mouteritzes, says:  
 
I was caught by surprise that you are a man with reason, respected as being in 
the greatest status of the teachers in your [country], adorned with deep 
knowledge in your [civilisation], having good behaviour and estimating 
everything as less valuable than truth.53 
 
 Whether the representations of the Mouteritzes and the Emperor reflect well how 
they behaved in the real discussion or not, it is important to note that in the Manuel’s 
work the relationship between both the protagonists is represented as that of the ideal 
teacher similar to a philosopher king and ardent student, between whom freedom of 
speech (parrhēsia) is secured. When, at the end of the second Dialogue, the Mouteritzes 
worried that his lengthy response to the Emperor would wear him out, the Emperor 
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decides to encourage his explication by an attentive attitude, after having thought that: 
 
One should not care about such a thing... and should speak with nothing 
hidden. And he [=Mouteritzes] also should do the same and continue to do so 
while holding the dialogue. And seeing that he thinks that I make profession of 
parrhēsia as well and inquires about it but does not ask for it, it would be right 
for me as well to keep what has been promised and not to be annoyed at a 
courageous response. This is the very thing which I promised to give to that man 
who had proclaimed it [= parrhēsia].54 
 
 The Emperor’s effort to form the relationship in which the freedom of speech is 
mutually ensured for both the interlocutors seems to be indicative of the author’s idea 
that intellectual persuasion is superior to enforcement by violence, which is attributed 
by Manuel as one of the most important characteristics of Islam, as he expounded in the 
seventh Dialogue.55 Therefore, the ideal of parrhēsia is also deeply rooted in the 
relational representation of the Mouteritzes and the Emperor in which the author 
pursued an ideal relationship between them. However, this relationship enabling 
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‘discussion without any coercion’ is carefully constructed by controlling the behaviours 
of both protagonists in the text so as to contribute to the triumph of the Emperor and 
Christianity. It should be noted again that the rational arguments which can be 
common to both interlocutors regardless of the difference of their religions are kept 
within the status of a mere utilitarian tool for explanation. Rather, it was the victory of 
Christian revelation against the (secular) logic of the Muslim scholar that Manuel 
wanted to demonstrate fictionally in order to enhance his prestige as the Christian 
emperor experienced in philosophy as well as that of his people, in response to his 
experience of the real discussion with the Mouteritzes. 
In Dialogues with a Persian, the author Manuel succeeded for the most part in 
integrating the impact stemming from his discussion with the Mouteritzes into his plan 
to show the victory of the Christian faith. Although under the restriction caused by the 
author’s literary and religious ideals, this process of integration made Manuel devise 
the rational arguments on religious issues as a novel medium to facilitate 
communication and discussion with an intellectual differing in religion from him. One 
can suppose that the genre of the elaborated fictional dialogue probably modelled after 
the ancient one was also introduced to anti-Islam polemical works to include the 
rational arguments in the work: the validity of using them would not have been so 
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evident without the existence of an interlocutor of a different religion. 
 
In accordance with the author’s plan the work ends with the conversion of the 
Mouteritzes, but there the Emperor expresses a little ‘mysterious’ apprehension: he 
thinks that Mouteritzes would not actually come to Constantinople to study Christian 
doctrines, and even doubts his pretext that it is difficult for him to go there because he 
has a family to sustain in Ankara.56 Why did Manuel add this part which has a 
deconstructive effect on his triumphant plan? Probably the main reason is that he 
wanted to make the story more plausible and reliable, and this means that the 
fictionality of his work was obvious for Byzantine literati at that time. The work was 
supposed to be shown only to his brother Theodore as evident from the description of the 
addressee in the original unabbreviated title,57 and this intimate readership may have 
enabled him to add this part. Manuel fulfilled what he considered as his duty: to 
represent the image of the ideal Christian emperor, but he was not blind to the political 
reality of his time. This work itself was expressive of the declining empire fluctuating 
between the imperial ideal and the harsh political reality. 
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George Amiroutzes:  
Dialogue with the Sultan of Turks on the Faith of Christ 
 
After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Byzantine intellectuals were forced to 
make a decision either to flee from their homeland in order to move to Western Europe 
or to Italian colonies in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to remain under the rule of the 
Ottoman Empire. Among those who chose the latter, there were, for example, George 
Scholarios and Theodore Agallianos acting in the Patriarchate, and those who served for 
the sultan Mehmed II such as the historian Michael Kritoboulos and George Amiroutzes, 
on whose dialogical work the present chapter focuses to analyse what Greek philosophy 
meant for him in communicating with Muslims in the new political situation. 
 
     George Amiroutzes was born in about 1400 to a family of magnates in the Empire 
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of Trebizond,58 and after he had grown up, he acted as an official of the empire, 
occupying important offices such as logothetes and protovestiarios. After he was taken 
to Constantinople by Mehmed II at the fall of Trebizond in 1461, he joined the entourage 
of the sultan, and probably died around 1470. He was renowned as a prominent 
philosopher, and in addition to philosophical treatises he wrote encomiastic poems for 
the sultan, the religious dialogue, and letters to Agallianos and Kritoboulos which have 
survived to our day. 
     There are some clues to his activity and influence in the Ottoman court. Firstly, 
according to the historian Kritoboulos, the knowledge of Amiroutzes amazed the sultan 
and they often had discussions on philosophical issues.59 Secondly, if we can rely on 
Laonikos Chalkokondyles and a Greek narrative of the sixteenth century, it seems that 
he enjoyed the support from the grand vizier Mahmud Pasha, who was allegedly a 
cousin of Amiroutzes.60 In addition, an Italian humanist, Francesco Filelefo, sent him a 
letter asking for his support in recommending an architect to the Ottoman court.61 
Therefore, it can be said that he had a certain status at the court and could wield some 
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power through his connections. 
     Another aspect contributing to his power can be explained in terms of the presence 
of Greeks and the interest in Greek culture at the Ottoman court. At that time, there 
were many Greeks, including both Orthodox and Muslim converts, who were working 
on composing Greek firmans.62 In addition, they also edited manuscripts of Greek 
classical works. This activity was primarily motivated by the sultan’s interest in the 
Greek culture: Mehmed visited an alleged ruin of Troy in an expedition,63 learned the 
Greek language to a certain extent64 and discussed with the patriarch Gennadios II the 
doctrine of the Orthodox Church.65 Amiroutzes himself made a map based on Ptolemy 
in cooperation with his own son fluent in Turkish and dedicated it to the sultan. This 
cultural atmosphere allowed him to make best use of his intellectual talent for his 
personal gain, and caused him to hope that the sultan would receive his message 
regarding Greek culture in one of the encomiastic poems to him: 
 
Do not be astonished, now listening to my voice, 
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For I [=Muse] am not alien to you, even if many think so, 
But I am the one who am always with you. 
(…) 
You also have become the emperor of Greeks as a man of valour. 
So how are your own things foreign, how are your things alien? 
Likewise, putting an end to the yoke of slavery, 
My Alexander made a decision as my son, 
And made good things of Persians his own possession. 
Then rejoice, emperor and Achilles with weapons, 
May you become the heir to the rule and the fortune in it.66 
 
This poem in which the Muse as a symbol of Greek arts and culture legitimises 
Mehmed II as a successor of the empire of Greeks certainly reflects Amiroutzes’ modus 
vivendi which may be deemed to be sycophantic. The more important point for us is the 
rhetoric used to persuade the sultan to receive Greek culture: its familiarity with the 
Orient is supported by the episode that Alexander the Great, obedient to the Muse in 
the poem, took cultural heritage from Persians in the conquest. It was this cultural 
                                                   
66 B. Janssens & P. Van Deun, ‘George Amiroutzes and his Poetical Oeuvre’ in: B. 
Janssen et al. (eds.) 2004. Philomathestatos. Leuven, p. 314. 
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heritage which was inherited by the present Greeks. On these grounds, it is justified 
that the sultan receives the Greek arts, whose culturally privileged status is secured by 
the Muse, and Amiroutzes seems to suggest that the succession of the world empire is 
confirmed by that of the Greek culture, which of course includes philosophy for the 
philosopher Amiroutzes. His idea about the significance of Greek culture for the sultan 
is primarily aimed at enhancing or sustaining his own position and that of his Greek 
colleagues at the Ottoman court. It also seems to influence the way in which Greek 
philosophy contributed to construct the image of an ideal sultan in his dialogical work 
as we will see below. 
 
     Amiroutzes’ religious dialogue entitled ‘Dialogue with the Sultan of Turks on the 
faith of Christ’ has the structure in which two personages, the “Sultan” and the 
“Christian Philosopher” appear and discussion proceeds by the former’s questions on 
the Christian doctrine and the latter’s responses. It has been thought that this work, 
probably completed at the end of the 1460s,67 has survived only in a Latin translation 
in the sixteenth century,68 and thus only this version has been published.69 Although 
                                                   
67 See A. Argyriou & G. Lagarrigue, “Georges Amitoutzès et son “dialogue sur la foi au 
Chirist tenu avec le sultan des Turcs”’, Byzantinische Forschungen 11 (1987) pp. 51-52. 
68 Argyriou & Lagarrigue (1987) p. 49. 
69 Monfasani found the original Greek text in MS Toledo, Biblioteca Capitular, 96-37 
and plans to publish it. See Monfasani (2011) p. 9 (note 23). 
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Kritoboulos’ mention of Amiroutzes’ discussion with Mehmed II refers to those of a 
philosophical nature, it is not difficult to think that the dialogue was composed on the 
basis of several real dialogues with Mehmed II. Of course this does not exclude the 
fictionality of the work which can reflect the author’s intention to compose the text. The 
topics treated in this work are: truth of the Incarnation, necessity of the Incarnation, 
anticipation of Christ by the prophets, the Holy Trinity and unity of God, and the 
resurrection of bodies of the dead. 
The issue as to for whom and for what purpose the dialogue was written has not 
been settled. Argyriou and Lagarrigue, the editors, argue that it was addressed to 
Latins on the grounds that Amiroutzes mentions in the prologue the decline of the 
intellectual level of the Greeks in the Ottoman territory which made impossible the 
comprehension of his work,70 as the citation below from the introduction of the dialogue 
shows: 
 
Since few is the remainder of those chased from that previous felicity [=Greeks], 
who judge that it is rather convenient for them to lament on their own misfortune, 
you would present this literary work to others in vain:they would not understand 
                                                   
70 Argyriou & Lagarrigue (1987) p. 50. 
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what you say and would not have leisure to listen to speeches.71 
 
      In addition, negative expressions about Ottoman rule such as ‘All the Greeks 
were already subjugated, my fatherland was led into captivity, and I also became a slave 
of that man, who is now oppressing Roman citizens and Greek people in his dominion’,72 
imply that he did not intend the dialogue to be translated into Turkish and read by 
Turks. In my opinion, this work was addressed to a Greek Orthodox outside Ottoman 
territory, because Amiroutzes says that his intention in composing the work was to 
present a practical case study which will contribute to future actual discussions with 
Muslims: 
 
Many have already written against their [ =Turks] religion so accurately that we 
should not add something. However, in order to refute what they are now bringing 
against our dogma, none of us has never argued by demonstrating something, and 
begun [discussion] from the principles which are appropriate: one who disputes 
should not demonstrate against opponents of our faith by the same presupposition 
as [he demonstrates by it] against those who opine [dogmatically] similarly to us. 
                                                   
71 Argyriou & Lagarrigue (1987) p. 62. 
72 Argyriou & Lagarrigue (1987) p. 64. 
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Rather it is necessary for the man who demonstrates suitably to provide grounds 
from what each [interlocutor] thinks and feels respectively and separately. Thus I 
composed this work, sometimes presenting the grounds which he [=the Sultan] 
brought relying on his proper strength, sometimes, on the other hand, [the 
grounds] which I provided against those ones.73 
 
      Thus, it can be said that Amiroutzes, while lamenting the miserable state of the 
Greeks under the Ottoman rules, completed the dialogue in the hope that a Greek in the 
future would be able to study his work and put it into practical use. 
The present analysis of the dialogue focuses not on the details of the theological 
discussions, but in the manner in which the dialogue proceeds and the way in which the 
interlocutors are represented. With respect to these points what should be noted is the 
function of philosophy or rational arguments in the dialogue. For example, an important 
feature of the discussion in the dialogue is the stress on ‘common notions’ (in Latin, 
communes notiones):  
 
(….) and he often talked with me not only on philosophical issues but also the 
                                                   
73 Argyriou & Lagarrigue (1987) p. 66. 
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difference of the dogmas of both nations, on which occasion he would question if 
our faith of Christians fits with common notions, but it was not permitted that 
any mention was made of his religion and faith.74 
 
‘Common notions’ can be considered to mean concepts or argumentations of 
secular philosophy which are not based on theological knowledge. Probably the original 
Greek word is ‘koinai ennoiai’, which was, according to Monfasani, granted ‘axiomatic 
force in establishing truth’ by the Hellenistic philosophical school and has fundamental 
importance in some of philosophical treatises of Amiroutzes.75  As shown in the above 
citation, since the topics of the dialogue were about the validity of the Christian faith 
seen from the common notions rather than its comparison with doctrines of Islam which 
might result in mentions and criticisms of its doctrines, the reliance on the common 
notions results from the limitation of the topics of discussion set by the Sultan on the 
one hand. However, this reliance can also be explained by the decision made by 
Amiroutzes. For example, a Greek scholar Michael Apostoles in a letter to Amiroutzes 
speaks positively of his avoidance of risky apologetic and theological argumentation: 
 
                                                   
74 Argyriou & Lagarrigue (1987) p. 64. 
75 Monfasani (2011) pp. 28-29. 
57 
 
If this thing is reproachable for many people due to the fear of God, still for a few 
people it is not worthy of accusation due to the reason they have... You believe in 
the immortal God... and did the best things not by any method which many 
people have practised and are practising, but due to necessity worthy of pardon 
and in a divine way and by reasoning...76  
 
Therefore, the discussion based on common notions was also convenient for 
Amiroutzes in that he could avoid the possibility of criticizing Islam using theological 
argumentation. 
So, how are the interlocutors, the Sultan and the Philosopher, represented in this 
dialogue in which common notions constitute the basis for the discussion? Firstly, 
throughout the dialogue, we can see an image of the Sultan as a kind of philosopher 
ruler who converses rationally with a Christian relying on his knowledge of philosophy, 
and not as a violent or foolish tyrant. Firstly, we can observe his mention of the 
Metaphysics of Aristotle to initiate his interrogation to Amiroutzes at the very 
beginning of the dialogue session. 77  A more salient example is that, against the 
Philosopher’s resort to the 71th Psalm as a proof of the prediction of the advent of 
                                                   
76 H. Noiret, Lettres inédites de Michel Apostolis. (Paris, 1889) pp. 83-84. 
77 Argyriou & Lagarrigue (1987) 66. 
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Christ, the Sultan argues, using philosophical vocabulary such as ‘form’ and ‘matter’, 
that the verses refer to the souls of just men: 
 
The words which you really believe, namely ‘He will remain with the Sun and 
before the Moon for generations of generations’, do not correspond with what you 
consider as mysteries. And likewise that ‘And his name remains before the Sun’ 
does not show necessarily that Christ is God. All these can fit with every 
righteous person as well, because the soul of anyone of them is immortal and 
remains with God eternally. There is no need to prove that a soul is immortal, 
leads an eternal life, and not only do we exist depending on it because it is a form 
and separable, but also any of human beings is driven by it: All [of us] 
acknowledge it everywhere. Thus, it remains to prove that the soul has existed 
prior to the Sun and the Moon, from which you think you have obtained for 
yourself a valid argument for proving the eternal divinity of Christ. For a double 
reason it is possible that the soul exists prior to the Sun and the Moon: [firstly] 
because every soul endowed with reason was produced prior to not only the Sun 
and the Moon but also all the world which we perceive by sense: it is necessary 
that separate substances have been produced simultaneously so that they can 
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share the same class, and have subsisted without needing any matter. In such a 
way angels were also created before the creation of the sky... The things proper 
to matter must not happen to what lacks matter [= natural and temporal 
progress toward perfection]. Therefore, it is necessary that the angels and the 
universal intellectual world have existed before the perceptible world is born.78 
 
     Such a philosophical argument developed in a meticulous and organised form 
suggests the author’s intervention or refinement of what Mehmed II said in the real 
sessions to make his image conform to Amiroutzes’ ideal in this dialogue with a fictional 
character. In addition, the Sultan in the work is imbued with philosophy in terms of his 
view of the priority of the criteria for judging what is truthful as well as the method by 
which he constructs his arguments: 
 
If the [miracles] of your nation and things similar to them are demonstrated not 
by widely recognised principles, but by respectively presupposed particularities, 
on what agreement do we know that they are true or fictive: for pagans, Jews, 
Christians and Arabs can respectively demonstrate what they admit according to 
                                                   
78 Argyriou & Lagarrigue (1987) pp. 168-170. 
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the belief of their religions, based on the things which they once presupposed for 
them? In this manner it could come about that all opinions of every sect are true79 
 
 In this remark, not only does the Sultan avoid explaining miracles relying on 
Allah for example, but also he seems to value the discussion on a philosophical basis as 
more preferable than the discussion based on theological argumentations. 
In concert with this image of the Sultan, the Christian philosopher in the dialogue 
agrees to use philosophical arguments in the discussion. In discussing the Holy Trinity, 
for example, at the beginning he reluctantly admits the necessity to resort to ‘common 
principles’, but maintains the stance that they are insufficient to reveal the 
transcendent nature of God. 
 
Since we are accused of serious crimes in this name of the Trinity, we say that it is 
necessary for us to address the problem from natural reason firstly, because we do 
not have other common principles which we could utilise. Yet any natural reason is 
not the one which would be convenient for this [= divine] matter and could reach it: 
nature is placed far below and the remotest from the divine essence, and reason 
                                                   
79 Argyriou & Lagarrigue (1987) p. 100. 
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derived from this nature cannot attain to such a sublime vertex.80 
 
However, he ends up explaining the Trinity by analogy with a human soul and 
making an excuse for that:  
 
This is the Trinity in which we believe. And these three persons are one God, 
because their substance is one in number. We call those properties three not 
according to the essence but those bringing forth the nature of the very thing. It is 
not surprising if these things are demonstrated by physical reasons as well. In 
everything there is a sort of simulacrum of the first principle, some of which are 
greater while others are smaller. Thus, there is nothing in which some similarity 
to the Trinity is not distinguished.81 
 
Here the philosopher seems to concede to the other interlocutor who has a 
different religious background by choosing the explanation using common notions over 
theologically accurate explication. 
The features of the religious dialogue of Amiroutzes can be seen as a mixture of 
                                                   
80 Argyriou & Lagarrigue (1987) p. 194. 
81 Argyriou & Lagarrigue (1987) p. 210. 
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reflection of his own experience in the actual discussions with Mehmed II and his ideal 
of a dialogue with a Muslim ruler, who is a philosopher ruler not relying on religious 
dogma but rather on the principles of philosophy. What can be concluded from the 
analysis of this dialogical work is that Amiroutzes recognised the value of Greek culture 
which not only equipped him with a cultural prestige but also gave him the means for 
asserting his own religious position to Muslims without danger. Although he expressed 
in the prologue the fear that the Greeks will cease to be Greeks after losing their culture, 
he still tried to show Greek intellectuals the importance of preserving the significance of 
Greek culture as a tool for smoothing communication with Muslims. 
When we compare Amiroutzes’ dialogue with Manuel Palaiologos’ Dialogues 
treated in the previous chapter, it can be said that both works have a common trait in 
that they adopted rational argumentation as a utilitarian tool for communication with 
Muslims. However, they differ in the final objectives of its use. In Manuel’s work, it was 
used to persuade the Mouteritzes to convert to Christianity and the superiority of faith 
to rational arguments was steadfastly maintained. On the other hand, Amiroutzes’ 
work uses Greek philosophy to avoid the danger of criticising Islam and to defend the 
stance of Christians in the religious discussion with Muslims. Surely, this change in the 
ideals of desirable relationships with Muslims which can be seen in the use of the 
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philosophical arguments reflects the difference of the periods and the situations under 







Gennadios Scholarios:  
Questions and Answers about the Divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ 
 
Gennadios Scholarios, toward the end of his career, left a short record of his 
dialogue with Muslim local elites on Christianity, which is entitled ‘Questions and 
answers about the divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ’.  Although it is difficult to trace 
how images of the interlocutors are represented in this erotapokrisis in which each 
question and answer has a more or less synoptic character, still through this work we 
can catch a glimpse of his stance with regard to the discussion with Muslims and the 
use of philosophical knowledge for the discussion. 
 
        Gennadios Scholarios, the first patriarch of Constantinople after the conquest 
of the city by the Ottomans, was born by the name of George in Constantinople around 
1400.82 He studied under scholars who were renowned at that time and his acquisition 
                                                   
82 For biographical information on Gennadios Scholarios, see: C. Turner ‘The Career of 
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of Latin resulted in his devotion to the study of Latin theologians such as St. Augustine 
and St. Thomas Aquinas, whose works he later translated into Greek and annotated. 
       Around 1430 he opened a private school in Constantinople where it is said that 
he taught grammar, rhetoric, logic, philosophy and Latin, while fulfilling his duty as a 
judge of the imperial capital. He accompanied the emperor John VIII as a lay counsellor 
at the council of Ferrara – Florence in 1438-9 and supported the union between the 
Catholic and the Orthodox Church. After returning to Constantinople, he seems to have 
become gradually inclined to the stance of anti-union, which was made evident when he 
succeeded to the role of the leader of the anti-unionists taking over from Mark 
Eugenikos on his deathbed. George Scholarios, after having retired from all offices 
following the death of John VIII (1448), became a monk and took the name of 
Gennadios. 
      At the fall of Constantinople, Gennadios was captured and then taken to Edirne. 
He was soon liberated, probably by the aid of Greek officials or merchants83 and 
acceded to the patriarchal throne at the beginning of the next year. During his 
                                                                                                                                                     
George-Gennadius Scholarius’ Byzantion 39 (1969) pp420-55; M. Blanchet, 
Geroges-Gennadios Scholarios (vers 1400- vers 1472) (Paris, 2008) especially pp.15-16. 
83 A letter written by Nikolas Isidoros, a ‘krites’of the sultan suggests that he 
financially supported a monastery in Constantinople where Gennadios was staying 
after his return to the city in the latter half of 1453.  See: J. Darrouzès, ‘Lettres de 




patriarchate which lasted about two years, he discussed Christianity with the sultan 
Mehmed II and this event caused him to compose some apologetic works explaining 
Christian doctrines. After the retirement from the patriarchate, he mainly lived in the 
John Prodromos monastery at the Mount Menoikeion in Macedonia, occasionally 
visiting Mount Athos and Constantinople when he was summoned to settle turmoil in 
the Patriarchate.84 The date of his death is unknown, but probably not long after 1472. 
 
     According to Gennadios’ writing which we treat in this chapter, the dialogue, or 
rather, question and answer session was triggered by an abrupt visit of a soldier with a 
written order to his cell: Gennadios was taken by him to Serres at first, then to a 
residence where two Muslim local elites were waiting for him to ask about the issue of 
the divinity of Christ in the Christian faith. He seems to have responded well to their 
questions, and finally was freed from this session, the record of which he wrote probably 
a few months later85 in a simple form of alternating their questions and his answers 
                                                   
84 It has been said that Gennadios became the patriarch of Constantinople three times, 
on the basis of his notes on margins of his manuscripts, but Blanchet denies it by 
arguing that what is meant by the word ‘anodos’ in these notes is not ‘ascension to the 
patriarchal throne’ but merely ‘journey to the imperial city’. See: M. Blanchet ‘Georges 
Gennadios Scholarios: A-t-il été trois fois Patriarche de Constantinople?’ Byzantion 71 
(2001) pp60-72; Blanchet, 2008: pp. 212-215. 
85 From the introduction to the text, it is known that the question-answer session took 
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with a brief explanation of the situation of the session at the beginning of the text. This 
discussion is thought to have taken place in 1470 on the basis of the indiction added to 
the margins of the extant manuscripts and mention in the work to his previous 
anti-Judaic work known to have been composed in the mid- 1460s.86 The concrete 
information on when, where and how the discussion happened provided by the text as 
well as the aforementioned form of the work as an erotapokrisis strongly suggest that 
the work is a memorandum of the actual discussion rather than a fictional dialogue 
aiming at literary elaboration and meticulous treatment of topics. 
       In addressing the issue of interreligious discussion appearing in Gennadios’ 
work, the first point which we should bear in mind is that the author certainly 
recognised that discussion with non-Christians on the Christian doctrines requires a 
way of explanation which is from that used in the discussion among Christians. He 
thought that this was possible through logical explanations of them: 
 
When we look at ourselves or discuss God with coreligionists, we do not have any 
need of logic and proofs about the divinity of Christ and this is a presupposition for 
                                                                                                                                                     
place in May and the text was composed at the end of the same indiction. See: L. Petit, X. 
Sideridès, M. Jugie (eds.) Oeuvres complètes de Gennade Scholarios (Paris, 1928, 1935, 
1936) (hereafter abbreviated as ‘Scholarios’), vol. 3, p. 458. 
86 Scholarios, vol. 3, pp. 458, 470. 
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us as the truest doctrine... To those who have opposite doctrines and therefore 
dispute with us, we can respond by the power of truth and give the logic and causes 
of this doctrine.87  
 
        His consciousness of the difference in the appropriate manner of the 
explanation for Christianity according to the religions in which the interlocutors believe 
seems to be confirmed by his thanks to Christ inserted at the end of the work: 
 
In this way I was liberated by the mercy of our Lord Christ who enlightened my 
heart so that I can state more divine and elevated things to those in  the family of 
the faith and bring what is simpler and easier to accept to those yet uninitiated.88  
 
Judging from the above two citations, it is implied that the explanation for 
non-Christians using the ‘logic and causes’ is possibly regarded as less elevated than the 
explanation based on the shared faith. Indeed, Gennadios places the basis of the 
doctrine of the divinity of Christ on belief, especially the belief in the apostles or saints 
                                                   
87 Scholarios, vol. 3, p. 459. 
88 Scholarios, vol. 3 p. 475. 
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to whom the divine mystery was exclusively revealed, because the observation of 
phenomenal things is not reliable and divine matters are beyond human reason and 
logic: 
 
And no matter how many of phenomenal and perceptible things we can approach, 
when we think that we possess truth about them only by [our] senses, we are 
deceived. By believing wise people teaching us, we can know the truth hidden by 
them [= senses]. While many judge by [their] senses that the Sun is a foot long, 
those trusting wise people believe that it is equal to or several times larger than 
the Earth... Then belief is even more necessary for divine things, not only is it 
unnoticed by the senses but also transcends human reason and logic, ...and those 
made wise by divine wisdom knew the truth about divine things, as much as it 
could be known then. God revealed it to them because of the excellent virtue and 
piety in them... The true doctrines about God and divine things prevailed and 
increased through true belief in teachers by sensible listeners, and the belief in 
such people was truly the belief in God: for they did not find [the truth] originally, 
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but taught and legislated inspired by God, and they were worth trusting because of 
their genuine virtue and great piety.89 
 
         Certainly Gennadios’ statement above does not mean that he renounces 
logical or philosophical arguments in explaining Christian faith. The above argument 
itself may be seen as a logical one in which the author tried to clarify the reason 
inherent in the matter ‘transcending human reason and logic’ as much as he could 
toward the non-Christians. Gennadios develops a more detailed and philosophical 
discussion with ‘the younger and more learned’90 of the two Muslim local elites when he 
interrupted the conversation between Gennadios and the other older Muslim who had 
been asking more general questions such as: ‘In the true Gospel being unforged as you 
say, where is it written that Christ is the Son of God? And where God?’;91 ‘Why do you 
not value the prophecy of Moses? ...You say that Christ is God, but Moses says he will 
come as a prophet, neither as the Son of God or God’:92 
 
                                                   
89 Scholarios, vol. 3, pp. 459-461. 
90 Scholarios, vol. 3, p. 458. 
91 Scholarios, vol. 3, p. 461. 
92 Scholarios, vol. 3, p. 468. 
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The younger Muslim: ‘How can you say that God is infinite? Infinity is 
quantitative. And quantity is accidental. But God is not accidental’ 
Gennadios: ‘Certainly God is precisely infinite, while quantity is not precisely so. 
For the quantity is said to be infinite only according to potentiality, which can be 
increased to infinity like a number and divided into infinity such as a continuum, 
namely so that it has potential to be increased or divided to infinity, even if none 
can increase the number or divide the continuum to infinity according to actuality. 
God is, on the other hand, infinite by actuality, so to speak, by essence, presence 
and power’93 
 
     The distinction between ‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’ is Aristotelian, and more 
directly seems to derive from the Scholastic tradition which Gennadios learned in his 
youth. In the discussion with this Muslim intellectual, in response to his argument 
denying the compatibility of the two natures of Christ he supports the co-existence of 
the divinity and the humanity in Christ by making an analogy to the relationship 
between a soul and a body for a human being: 
 
                                                   
93 Scholarios, vol. 3, p. 471. 
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You endanger an issue of human beings by your brightness. It is clear that a man 
consists of a soul and a body. The soul is immaterial, incorporeal, simple and 
rational, and thus separate from the body and immortal. The body, on the other 
hand, is complex and material and thus mortal. So the soul is transformed into the 
body or the body into the soul, or both fuse with one another. However, this is 
obviously impossible... the soul and the body are united in a person and the one 
person consists of both. And such union is called hypostatic or individual: the soul 
and the body are combined to be one hypostasis and one individual without 
transformation, and the soul has command of the body as a form and a mover 
while the body has relationship with the soul as a matter and an organ. Then why 
should a contradiction arise about our Lord Christ, in which the divine nature and 
the human nature were united…?94  
 
     This way of explaining a divine matter by the analogy of a temporal phenomenon 
can be recognised as adopting an argument using ‘what is simpler and easier to accept 
to those yet uninitiated’ in the aforementioned citation. Although the scholastic 
argumentation is not exclusively for the persuasion of infidels but an important road 
                                                   
94 Scholarios, vol. 3, pp. 472-3. 
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through reason to the truth for Christians as well, the text shows that the arguments 
using philosophical concepts were actually useful for smoother and more constructive 
discussion with Muslims on the condition that they were equipped with such knowledge. 
Indeed, the communication with the younger interlocutor was more successful at least 
for the modern reader’s eye in comparison with that with the older Muslim, whom 
Gennadios attempted to overwhelm by a plethora of biblical citations and historical 
proofs supporting his arguments.95 
       From the present concise record of the dialogue, it is not easy to draw the exact 
attitude of Gennadios toward arguments using philosophical knowledge. As mentioned 
above, Gennadios keeps the stance that the best way to attain the truth of Christianity 
is faith, and explanations resorting to philosophical argumentation (especially analogy 
to temporal phenomena) are used for the comprehension of non-Christians. Yet one may 
be able to surmise that the use of philosophy is not a mere second best way to persuade 
non-Christians, for Gennadios mentions ancient Greeks and Romans in the writing. He 
says that ‘whereas [the advent of Christ as the Son of God] was clarified to Jews who 
had been pious until then through divine and holy prophecies, it was clarified to 
polytheists all over the world and especially Greeks and Romans who exceeded all the 
                                                   
95 For example, see Scholarios, vol. 3, p. 462 and pp. 464-7. 
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others in wisdom and other power through oracles96’ and ‘on behalf of Jews, polytheists 
and idolaters everywhere received the preaching of the truth, and the wiser people of 
the polytheists all over the world were the first who joined the preaching’.97 According 
to this perspective, the ancient Greeks and Romans were given as positive and 
important a role as Hebrews in the divine plan of salvation because the former 
contributed to the initial phase of the expansion of Christianity by their wisdom. In this 
respect, ancient philosophy as the symbol of their intellectual excellence is not 
completely alien to the truth revealed by God.98 Therefore, it can be suggested that 
Gennadios considered philosophical arguments not simply as a practical but inferior 
way to facilitate communication with Muslim intellectuals when discussing the 
doctrines of Christianity, but as a desirable manner to reveal religious truth to the 
infidels whom Christians needed to persuade by ‘logic and causes’. 
      As for the mode of relationship between Gennadios and the Muslim local elites in 
the text, the following two points can be pointed out. Firstly, Gennadios does not avoid 
the declaration that the discourses about Christ in Islam are inferior to those in 
                                                   
96 Scholarios, vol. 3, p. 467. 
97 Scholarios, vol. 3, p. 465. 
98 Gennadios’ more evident opinions in the same vein can be found in ‘the unique road 
to salvation’, an apologetic work which he composed during a series of discussions with 
the sultan Mehmed II on Christianity. In this work, he argues that not only did more 
rational people than Jews contribute to the first phase of expansion of Christianity, but 
also ancient Greeks had a sort of prototype of the doctrine of the Trinity, and Greek 
philosophy stemmed from the Law of Moses. See Scholarios, vol. 3, pp. 440, 443, 450. 
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Christianity, although this blunt tone is attenuated by the additional remark that 
Muslims have some good notions about Christ and in this respect they are superior to 
Judaic people.99 Secondly, he mentions seemingly with pride his experience of a series 
of discussions about Christian doctrines held at the Ottoman court in which he satisfied 
the audience by his extensive explanations100 and this reference finally resulted in his 
liberation on the condition that he will send to the Muslim interlocutors the apologetic 
work which he composed on the occasion of the dialogue at the court. Probably 
Gennadios knew the effect of mentioning his ‘prestigious’ achievement, and his 
experience of getting through the previous dialogue seems to have made him somewhat 
assertive in the present question and answer session. The fact that Gennadios could 
take advantage of the authority emanating from the Ottoman sultan in communication 
with the Muslims can be interpreted as a symptom of the process in which the status of 
ex-Byzantines including intellectuals was, however second-rate, being stabilised and 
integrated into the social hierarchy of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
  
                                                   
99 Scholarios, vol. 3, p. 461. 






This dissertation has analysed three religious dialogues with Muslims written 
by Byzantine literati who had actual intellectual communications with Muslims in the 
critical socio-political environment in which the declining Byzantine Empire was finally 
superseded by the rule of the Ottomans. In response to the new experience of 
communicating with Muslim intellectuals invested with an air of rising civilisation, the 
authors attempted to seek an ideal form of relationship between Byzantine and Muslim 
intellectuals in their writings. As a corollary of religious discussions between those who 
did not share a common faith and scripture, an important foundation for their 
communication and relationship was the use of argumentation based on knowledge of 
secular philosophy or analogy using perceptible things. Although the authors expressed 
some reluctance to resort to philosophical and rational arguments to explain 
supernatural concepts and phenomena regarding divinity, they surely recognised the 
value of such arguments in the discussion with Muslims. 
The reason for employing philosophical and rational arguments in religious 
dialogue varied according to the authors. While the Emperor in the work of Manuel II 
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Palaiologos uses them to persuade the Muslim interlocutor to accept Christianity, 
George Amiroutzes and Gennadios Scholarios adopt them to facilitate the 
understanding of the Muslims about their religious stance. This difference in the 
purpose influenced the images of the Muslims which the authors represented in the 
texts. Whereas Manuel represented the Mouteritzes as a studious but intellectually 
inferior student educated by the Emperor, the Sultan in Amiroutzes’ work is 
represented as a tolerant and intellectual ruler who listens to the opinions of his subject 
having a different religious background from his. In addition, it should be noted that, in 
the case of the erotapokrisis of Gennadios, the Muslim local elites paid due respect to 
the author after they realised that he succeeded in the previous discussion about 
Christianity at the Ottoman court: an effective explanation of the faith of the Byzantine 
Greeks contributed to securing their status in the Ottoman society.   
The change in purpose of using the philosophical and rational arguments partly 
reflects the fact that Manuel was a Byzantine emperor one of whose missions was to 
propagate Christianity through his virtues and the other authors were not. Still, this 
change certainly indicates the demise of the political ideology of Byzantium, without 
which the ex-Byzantine intellectuals were forced to search for a new ideal with respect 
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